Over the past several years, U.S. based organizations have curtailed traditional internal verification efforts due to reliance on contract manufacturers, distributors and suppliers to do the right thing. The inspection of ESD sensitive parts is very important, but without special safeguards, the additional handling to remove and repack a product for validation can cause both physical and ESD damage in the process. For parts, including those not sensitive to static electricity, measures must be utilized to detect, inspect and validate the packaging that identifies and protects the product.
In 2010, the author was invited to speak before the NASA QLF (Quality Leadership Forum) and is the first to present on issues of suspect counterfeit ESD packaging & materials in the DoD supply chain. This speaking engagement led to numerous articles and studies on suspect counterfeit or non-compliant materials and packaging used during the manufacturing process. No longer is a supplier’s specification sheet adequate proof that an ESD packaging product is compliant to ANSI/ESD S541 or Military Standards.
Many Federal agencies employ the practice to Google Earth suppliers for verification that the business is not a pass-through entity or garage-style operation.
In Fiscal Year 2013, the Department of Homeland Security seized counterfeit goods valued at over $1.7 billion at U.S. borders. The facts are as follows (Source: http://www.iacc.org)
In Figure 2, the suspect counterfeit fire extinguisher could be filled with compressed air or baking soda. Increasingly, the perpetrators place human lives in the balance just to make more profit. Would the reader have confidence in using the suspect counterfeit fasteners while hoisting a soldier as illustrated in the DUSTOFF helicopter photo, illustrated in Figure 3?
Figure 2 (Candice T. Bruce, MSgt, Quality Assurance Technician, 440 SCOS/GWAB, 192 SCMS, 23 Sweeney Blvd., Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA 23665)
In the examples provided for the fire extinguishers and fasteners, and, especially, today one must really understand the global supply chain. Another issue that organizations face is the purchase of products, off the Materials Qualification List, obtained online, in glossy catalogs that land on your desk every month, or reliance upon a vendor specification sheet without verification or validation of the manufactured good’s performance. What does the author recommend? Trust but verify!
Supplier non-conformance and suspect counterfeit packaging can represent a hazard to electrostatic discharge (ESD) sensitive devices or components through cross contamination. Figure 4 illustrates what happens when ESD sensitive devices from the manufacturer were subjected to long-term storage at 160°F for 14 days (accelerated aging). The test compared new EEE components stored in a suspect counterfeit IC Carrier and a compliant Dip Tube for the same duration. The ESD sensitive device packaged in a safe IC Carrier (Dip tube) exhibits no evidence of antistatic transfer. Suspect counterfeit ESD packaging can, however, incorporate the use of antistats containing harmful amines. Supplying amine safe products can prove costly to the counterfeiter. To dip or to spray packaging with a soapy mixture typically found in a grocery store is sometimes utilized as an unauthorized substitute with consequences. Issues with antistats put to rest in the early 1990s have resurfaced. A launch delay due to contaminating antistatic bubble during long-term storage occurred; suspect counterfeit packaging related damage to ESD sensitive devices has taken place during shipping, storage, incoming inspection and manufacturing. Many of these incidents could have been prevented using a formalized qualification sequence reinforced with periodic verification for chemical, physical and ESD control integrity before use in the supply chain.
Figure 4 (Items courtesy of Albert Escusa, TI)
Several aerospace related occurences have involved long-term storage issues for supplier non-conformance with antistatic foams, antistatic bubble, vacuum formed antistatic polymers and ESD safe moisture barrier bags. The late John Kolyer, Ph.D. (Boeing, Ret.) and Ray Gompf, P.E., Ph.D. (NASA-KSC, Ret.) were advocates in the utilization of a formalized physical testing material qualification process. Today, however, some prime contractors and contract manufacturers rely heavily upon a visual inspection process for ESD packaging materials. Over the past 10 years, however, suspect counterfeit ESD packaging materials have continued to infiltrate the global supply chain.
Despite a visual inspection of an outer package label and bar code scanning by an electronic component distributor, suspect counterfeit re-topped electrostatic discharge (ESD) sensitive components could still be purchased in error. To compound the matter, a new and very inexpensive method of removing a component’s lettering is now being utilized by the counterfeiter that does not exhibit evidence of tampering as illustrated in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Left: Original Right: Tampered
One countermeasure for detection is the use of RFID in packaging for incoming inspection and inventory tracking. Another measure constitutes hands on training for incoming shipping and receiving personnel by use of advanced inspection techniques of packaging materials. For example, ESD sensitive components are typically protected by packaging that industry identifies by color: i.e., pink or blue for antistatic bubble, black for carbon loaded polymer JEDEC trays and Tape & Reel.
No longer can color be an indicator of static control packaging performance, however, this identification marker is widely accepted by semiconductor, automotive, medical device, aerospace, and defense. A simple and cost effective electrical resistance test can very easily determine if the packaging is compliant beyond misidentification by color. If a package fails this initial test, then it should be flagged for further investigation as components could have been compromised. A simple rule to remember constitutes: A counterfeiter will not be motivated to package fraudulent ESD sensitive components in compliant static control packaging that could add much more in material costs alone.
In the packaging area, suspect counterfeit ESD packaging materials that have compromised the supply chain include IC Carriers (The Dip Tube), JEDEC Trays and Tape & Reel. See Table 1 for a more comprehensive list.
IC Carriers, JEDEC Trays and Tape & Reel are utilized in equipment centers (Figure 6). Due to limited space for a single publication, the author will focus on the consequences of using a suspect counterfeit JEDEC tray that is non-compliant to ANSI/ESD S541.
The strapping was charge generating to 2260 and -1295 peak volts as illustrated in Figure 7. Earlier, another set of JEDEC trays was evaluated for 2-point resistance that measured a failing value of 6.7 x 1011 ohms at 50%RH.
When a suspect counterfeit insulative JEDEC tray is populated with ESD sensitive devices that could be from a legitimate source, then the act of removal of said components for inspection could damage that device Figure 8).
What happens when a JEDEC tray is not properly banded in comparison to a process utilizing ANSI/ESD S541 compliant strapping by a grounded operator using an ANSI/ESD S4.1 work surface during the banding process? A non-compliant strapping process generated ESD events at over 300 volts for a 3 banded JEDEC tray system (Figure 9). Therefore, affixing strapping over a JEDEC tray package (placed in quarantine) without conductive corrugated top and bottom pads should be avoided for ESD compliance.
Conversely, using ESD corrugated pads with a protective non-sloughing finish facing inward insures that a charge generating strapping process will not compromise the package. As illustrated in Figure 10, the black strapping is static dissipative with ESD corrugated shielding pads. Thus, sound protocols were utilized by the component maker who utilizes a formalized materials qualification sequence in packaging of EEE ESD sensitive devices. The banding process therefore was unremarkable for ESD events at 9 volts.
In short, testing static control materials and packaging that protects ESD sensitive electronic components needs to be mandatory. It is our view that mission critical parts and components that require ESD packaging must be verified on a regular basis due to supplier non-compliance or suspect counterfeiting. As a consequence, device integrity is less likely be compromised or to become a cause for damage or failure due to the packaging.
Special Thanks to Albert Escusa of Texas Instruments for his support.
Bob Vemillion, CPP/Fellow Certified ESD & Product Safety Engineer-iNarte is a subject matter expert in ESD mitigation of materials and packaging and is an ESDA Standards Committee Member. In 2010, Bob was the first to present on suspect counterfeit ESD packaging in the supply chain at the NASA-QLF. RMV is located on-site at NASA-Ames Research Center and is a NASA Industry Partner. Bob publishes numerous articles and white papers on advanced materials, packaging non-compliance and suspect counterfeiting in manufacturing, materials handling, shipping and long-term storage for the aerospace/defense, medical and electronics sectors. Speaking engagements include invitations from the DOD, DOE and NASA to present on supplier Iisues with materials and packaging. RMV is a NASA approved ESD laboratory at NASA-Ames. An internationally recognized author and inventor, Bob develops professional level ESD packaging seminars for Cal Poly, SJSU, UC Berkeley, Loyola Marymount, Clemson University and Oxford University. RMV is a 3rd Party ESD material testing, training and consulting company. Bob Vermillion is an active member of SAE G-19 Counterfeit Components and SAE G-21Counterfeit Materiel Committees.
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